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Humberto Maturana, Everything Is Said By an Observer, Gaia: A Way of Knowing, Lindisfarne Press, New York, 1987, p.71
. . . For example, a chair is a composite unity. The relations between the parts that make it a chair are the organization. If I saw it into pieces and separate these pieces, would you say you still have a chair? No, you would not say that. You would say, "Why did you disorganize my chair?" I destroyed the chair by disorganizing it. The relations between components, then--that which makes a chair a chair--are its organization. A unity is a composite unity of some kind only as long as its organization is an invariant. A chair will be a chair only as long as it has the organization of a chair. If the organization changes, you no longer have a chair. This is why, by the way, I do not think I should ever use the notion of self-organization, because that cannot be the case. Operationally it is impossible. That is, if the organization changes, the thing changes. A chair is a chair, a composite unit of a particular kind, only as long as its organization is invariant.
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